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APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
§78-6-3(2) 
Not later than two days before the date of trial 
regarding the original affidavit, the defendant may upon the 
payment of the fee prepare a counteraffidavit as set forth in 
§78-6-2.5, or at his request the judge or justice or clerk of the 
court shall draft the counteraffidavit for him. 
§78-6-10 
(1) The judgment of the small claims department of the 
justices1 and circuit court is conclusive upon the plaintiff 
unless a counterclaim has been interposed. 
(2) If the matter is heard in the small claims depart-
ment of the circuit court, the defendant may appeal the judgment 
of the circuit court to the Court of Appeals by filing a notice 
of appeal within five days of the entry of the judgment against 
him. 
(3) If the matter is heard in the small claims depart-
ment of the justices1 court, the defendant may obtain a trial de 
novo in the circuit court by filing in the circuit court of the 
county a petition for trial de novo within five days of the entry 
of the judgment against him. 
§78-27-38 
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone 
bar recovery by that person. He may recover from any defendant 
or group of defendants whose fault exceeds his own. However, no 
defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount 
in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to that defen-
dant. 
U.R.C.P. 13 
(k) Claim in excess of court's jurisdiction. Where 
any counterclaim or cross-claim or third-party claim is filed in 
an action in a city court or justice's court, and due to its 
limited jurisdiction, such court does not have the power to grant 
the relief sought thereby, it shall suspend all proceedings in 
the entire action and certify the same and transmit all papers 
therein to the district court of the county in which such inferi-
or court is maintained, upon the payment by the party filing such 
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim of the fees 
required for certifying the record on appeal from such court and 
for docketing the same in the district court. The fees herein 
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required to be paid, shall be deposited with the clerk of the 
inferior court at the time of filing such counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim. For failure so to do, the 
court may, upon motion of the adverse party, after notice, strike 
such counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. 
U.R.C.P. 19 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is 
subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive 
the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of action shall 
be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete 
relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he 
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is 
so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may 
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect 
that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties 
subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or 
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed 
interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order 
that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but 
refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or in a proper 
case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to 
venue and his joinder would render the venue of the action 
improper, he shall be dismissed from the action. 
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not 
feasible. If a person as described in Subdivision (a)(l-(2) 
hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether 
in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the 
parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person 
being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be con-
sidered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment 
rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or 
those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective 
provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other 
measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether 
a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; 
fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the 
action is dismissed for non-joinder. 
(c) Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading 
asserting a claim for relief shall state the names, if known to 
the pleader, of any persons as described in Subdivision 
(a)(l)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons why they 
are not joined. 
(d) Exception of class actions. This rule is subject 
to the provisions of Rule 23. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
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U.R.C.P. 52 
(A) Effect, In all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the 
facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon . . . 
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DESCRIPTION OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This action was commenced in Salt Lake County Circuit 
Court, Small Claims Division, Salt Lake Department and tried 
before a judge pro tempore on January 29, 1987 and final judgment 
entered on January 31, 1987. This Court has jurisdiction to hear 
this appeal pursuant to §78-6-10(2) U.C.A. (amended 1986). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
This Court is being asked to consider the following 
issues on appeal: 
1. Whether the competent and relevant evidence adduced 
at trial was sufficient to sustain a judgment in favor of Plain-
tiff. 
2. Whether trial court erred in failing to grant 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss without prejudice based upon Rule 
19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. Whether trial court erred in failing to apply the 
provisions of §78-27-38 U.C.A. (as amended) in determining 
damages or determining value of damages. 
4. Whether the trial court's failure to make findings 
of fact and conclusions of law to establish the basis of judgment 
and upon what finding relief was granted requires reversal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Hood brought an action in Small Claims Court, 
Salt Lake Department Circuit Court seeking compensation from 
Defendant Layton for property damage done to Hood's automobile as 
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the result of a collision. Layton sought dismissal without 
prejudice to seek joinder of Jean Pahl, who was the driver of 
Hood's vehicle, and to remove the matter to the Circuit Court by 
counterclaiming or cross-claiming in accordance with Rule 13 (k), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court denied the motion and 
trial was had on January 29, 1987, and judgment was granted in 
favor of Plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 27, 1986, Charles V. Layton and immediate 
family members traveled to the residence of his ex-wife, Jean 
Pahl, to recover Mr. Layton1s boat then in the possession of Ms. 
Pahl. During the course of recovery, Layton and his brother each 
drove separate vehicles into the parking lot where the boat was 
located. Layton attached the boat to his truck and commenced to 
exit the lot preceded by his brother when Jean Pahl appeared in a 
1973 Toyota Corolla owned by her sister Suzanne Hood and blocked 
the driveway. 
Following a curt discussion between Layton1s brother 
and Pahl, the Hood vehicle backed up to allow passage. While 
Layton followed his brother one or more collisions occurred 
involving his truck and the Hood auto. Each party asserted at 
trial that the collision was intentionally caused by the other 
driver. 
Layton was prosecuted by Salt Lake County Attorney on 
behalf of the State of Utah for violation of 76-6-106 U.C.A. 
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(as amended) for Criminal Mischief, a Third Degree Felony due to 
damage in excess of $1,000.00. The matter was reduced to a Class 
A misdemeanor at preliminary hearing, and ultimately dismissed 
upon joint motion of the parties. 
Hood filed this action on January $, 19 87 and Layton 
was served on the evening of January 22, 1987. Upon receiving 
copy of the served affidavit and in order to preserve any actions 
since the time for counterclaim by Defendant under §78-6-3(2) 
U.C.A. (amended 1986) had expired, counsel filed a notice of 
intent to counterclaim in excess of jurisdictional amount as well 
as a motion to dismiss the affidavit without prejudice since Hood 
had not named Pahl as a party. The motion was denied and trial 
proceeded. 
At trial clearly inadmissible hearsay was admitted, as 
well as other conjectural, speculative and irrelevant evidence. 
Undisputed, however, was the fact that Layton1s brother preceded 
him out of the lot and that Pahl initially had driven Hood's car 
to a position blocking the driveway exit. Pahl backed up to 
allow passage of the first vehicle and the collision occurred 
thereafter. 
The motion was not due to failure of witnesses to appear or 
lack of evidence, as indicated at trial in this matter, but based 
upon statements of witnesses not appearing at this trial. 
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At the close of the case, the judge pro tempore found 
for the Plaintiff, but did not relate the evidence upon which he 
relied on the legal basis for such relation. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial below failed to produce sufficient competent 
and relevant evidence to sustain the Plaintiff's burden of proof, 
therefore the judgment is in error. 
The trial court erred in proceeding without directing 
the joinder of an indispensable party under Rule 19, U.R.C.P., 
and in its assessment of damages. 
Following the conclusion of trial, the court failed to 
properly make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
contravention of the requirements of Rule 52, U.R.C.P. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT 
FOR PLAINTIFF BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE 
As a threshhold question, this Court should first 
examine whether the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to 
12 
sustain a judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Appellant herein 
asserts that taken in the light most favorable to the prevailing 
party, the total evidence is, at best, a wash and fails to 
sustain Plaintiff's burden of proof. 
2 / 
Generally, the court should view with some incredulity the 
issue of insufficiency of evidence in a small claims action. 
However, the underlying procedural defects presently existing in 
the process, and later discussed herein, create the notion that 
this issue is at least symptomatic and therefore should be 
reviewed. 
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Initially it could be argued that there is no appropri-
ate standard to apply since this judgment stands absent any 
formal finding of fact in support. Otherwise, such findings 
should be scrutinized in a light most favorable to the prevailing 
party and with deference to the proximity of the fact-finder 
below. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (1985); Sharpe v. 
American Medical Systems, Inc., 671 P.2d 185 (1983). 
However, a generic approach would still contemplate the 
axiom that judgments supported by clear, satisfactory, and 
convincing proof cannot be disturbed on appeal. Lynch v. 
MacDonald, 367 P.2d 464, 12 U.2d 427 (1962). In that case, the 
Utah Supreme Court said that where a case is decided at least in 
part upon conflicting evidence, the view of that evidence taken 
by the trial court should be favored. 
Unfortunately in this case, it is impossible to deter-
mine which evidence the trial court favored. Each of the parties 
testified, along with their respective witnesses, and often in 
cacophonous unison. During the course of those testimonies, 
clearly irrelevant and/or inadmissible statements were 
proffered. 
As encouraged by the instruction on the form pleadings, 
neither party appeared with counsel. The apparent burden regard-
ing questions of evidence obviously shifts to the trial court. 
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While we cannot speculate what the court's ruling might have been 
on specific objections, we can postulate that no evidence at 
trial was so weighty as to satisfy the Plaintiff's burden, which 
"requires that the evidence be such that 
reasonable minds acting fairly thereon could 
believe that the existence of the fact is 
more probable or more likely than its 
non-existence, so that a person of ordinary 
prudence could believe the fact with suffi-
cient assurance to act upon it in relation to 
matters of serious concern in his own af-
fairs." 
Morris v. Farmers Home 
Mutual Insurance Co., 
500 P.2d 505, 507; 28 
U.2d 206 (1972) 
Whatever we have in this case, we clearly do not have 
that level of proof so as to affirm the judgment of the trial 
court, as so the judgment should be reversed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT 
THE MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 19 
A portion of the error in this case can be attributed 
to the recent amendment to §78-6-1 et seq. U.C.A. (amended 1986) 
to small claims actions and appeals from judgment therefrom, 
which were made effective a short time prior to the instigation 
of this action. That portion of the code likewise does not 
provide for third-party action otherwise permitted by Rule 14, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In the instant action, Layton was sued by Hood for 
property damage incurred as a result of an auto collision al-
though Hood was not the driver. Layton desired a third-party 
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action against the driver of Hood's car, which is not contemplat-
ed within the Small Claims Court Act. Knowing that the amount in 
controversy would exceed $1,000.00, Defendant filed a notice of 
intention to file such claim pursuant to Rule 13 (k), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure so as to preserve any claims against those 
/4 parties under that rule. 
The driver of Plaintiff's vehicle was not a party at 
that time, and a motion to dismiss under Rule 19, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure (as amended) was filed in order to permit the 
suit to be reinstituted in the Circuit Court. 
Defendant asserts that failure to grant the Rule 19 
motion was error because it adversely affected the full and fair 
determination of rights of the parties to the lawsuit. Cowen and 
Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109 (1984). For that 
reason the driver, Jean Pahl, was a necessary party. Johnson v. 
Utah State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (1980). 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES 
The Utah Comparative Negligence Statute §78-27-38 
U.C.A. (as amended), provides: 
"The fault of a person seeking recovery shall 
not alone bar recovery by that person. He 
may recover from any defendant or group of 
defendants whose fault exceeds his own. 
However, no defendant is liable to any person 
seeking recovery for any amount in excess of 
the proportion of fault attributable to that 
defendant. 
4/ 
This precautionary measure appears to be unnecessary in light 
of the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Faux v. Mickelsen, 725 P.2d 
1372 (1986). 
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The Appellant herein asserts that if the award of the 
court was based upon the negligent operation of a vehicle, that 
award should be reduced accordingly due to Hood's own negligence 
in allowing her sister to operate Hood's vehicle while in such an 
apparently agitated and irrational state. 
The Defendant further asserts that there is no compe-
tent evidence to demonstrate the extent of damage to Hood's 1973 
Toyota Corolla which would substantiate an award of $1,000.00. 
IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO MAKE 
SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REQUIRES REVERSAL 
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly 
states: 
(a) Effect. In al] actions tried upon the 
facts without a jury or with an advisory 
jury, the court shall find the facts special-
ly and state separately its conclusions of 
law thereon, . . . 
This rule is unconditional, and subject only to the 
waiver provisions of subsection (c) which do not apply in this 
case. 
It has been long held that failure of the trial court 
to make findings of fact on all material issues is reversible 
error where it is prejudicial. Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233 
(1983); Romrell v. Zions First National Bank, N.A., 611 P.2d 392 
(1980); Gaddis Investment Co. v. Morrison, 278 P.2d 284, 3 U.2d 
43 (1954); Pike v. Clark, 79 P.2d 1010, 95 U. 235 (1938). 
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When our inspired Legislature ordained the transition 
of small claims court in the Circuit Courts system, the ramifica-
tions were unjustly ignored. From a convenient and facilitating 
forum for simple dispute resolution, it now exists as the most 
recent venue in a morass of courts impossible to be utilized or 
understood by the common person. 
As an aside, but of some significance to the Appellant 
in this case, is the curiosity that when the amendment of 
§78-6-10 U.C.A. (amended 1986) was effected, the heading left in 
the term "Attorney's fee" but the body is void of any reference 
to entitlement by either party. Appellant asserts his entitle-
ment to attorney fees in this matter and herein prays for that 
relief. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the entire purpose of small claims court 
has been defeated by this new legislation. The Appellant re-
quests and this Court is compelled to remand this and similar 
matters to the court below for further proceeding, until such 
time as the procedures are consistent with the purpose. 
DATED this Q day of May, 1987. 
SCOTT W. R E E D \ ^ 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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